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Abstract
Traditional cryptography assumes an eavesdropper receives an error-free copy of the transmitted
ciphertext. Wyner’s wiretap channel model recognizes that at the physical layer both the intended receiver
and the passive eavesdropper inevitably receive an error-prone version of the transmitted message which
must be corrected prior to decryption. This paper considers the implications of using both channel
and cryptographic codes under the wiretap channel model in a way that enhances the information-
theoretic security for the friendly parties by keeping the information transfer to the eavesdropper small. We
consider a secret-key cryptographic system with a linear feedback shift register (LFSR)-based keystream
generator and observe the mutual information between an LFSR-generated sequence and the received
noise-corrupted ciphertext sequence under a known-plaintext scenario. The effectiveness of a noniterative
fast correlation attack, which reduces the search time in a brute-force attack, is shown to be correlated
with this mutual information. For an iterative fast correlation attack on this cryptographic system, it is
shown that an EXIT chart and mutual information are very good predictors of decoding success and
failure by a passive eavesdropper.
I. INTRODUCTION
Typical communication systems use cryptographic primitives at a layer above the physical layer
to achieve data security. Considering that both friendly and eavesdropping parties inevitably receive
codewords corrupted by errors at the (noisy) physical layer, Wyner introduced the wiretap channel model
[1] where it was subsequently shown that error control coding (ECC) can contribute to the security against
a passive eavesdropper. In this paper we consider the practical situation where both error correction coding
and cryptography are used in a wiretap setting and show how the channel errors significantly inhibit the
ability of the eavesdropper to recover the cryptographic key using well-known attacks. We apply the
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Fig. 1. The wiretap channel model shows friendly parties communicating over a main channel, and an eavesdropper observing
communications through a wiretap channel.
widely used tool of EXIT charts to the wiretap channel and show how they can be used to predict a
threshold behavior on the eavesdropper’s ability to recover the cryptographic key using a known-plaintext
iterative attack.
The wiretap channel model that employs coding and cryptography is given in Fig. 1. In this paper
we assume a simple XOR-based cryptographic system whose key is generated using linear feedback
shift registers (LFSR). The noisy channel model assumes two discrete memoryless binary symmetric
channels (BSC). The main channel links friendly parties, while the wiretap channel represents a passive
eavesdropper observing a noise-corrupted version of the communications between the two friendly parties.
Wyner’s wiretap model was used to prove the existence of codes which maintain a high level of security
and guarantee reliable communication between friendly parties [1], [2]. Practical codes were developed
by Wei [3], and later examples include [4] and [5].
Secrecy capacity Cs is a fundamental limit on the rate of secure transmission [1], [2]. When the
main channel and the wiretap channel are modeled as BSCs, the secrecy capacity is given by Cs =
Cm−Cw where Cm and Cw are the capacities of the main channel and the wiretap channel, respectively.
Strictly positive secrecy capacity implies an advantage in the quality of the main channel over that of
the wiretap channel, which implies the crossover probability in the wiretap channel pw exceeds that
of the main channel pm such that 0 ≤ pm < pw ≤ 0.5. This can be the case in scenarios where
distance between parties is a factor in channel quality, such as a zoned security application where friendly
parties communicate inside a building and the eavesdropper monitors communications from outside of
the building [6].
In applications which exhibit strictly positive secrecy capacity, tandem channel and cryptographic codes
can potentially provide enhanced security. It was shown in [6] that an eavesdropper can be forced to
increase the number of computations needed to compromise a cryptographic system if the eavesdropper’s
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data vector following the wiretap channel and the channel decoder still maintains a small percentage of
errors. Assuming the quality of the main channel is such that the channel decoder is able to correct all
of the channel errors, reliable communications can be maintained. In this paper we enhance the results
of [6] by showing that mutual information is correlated to the eavesdropper’s ability to recover the secret
key of a cryptographic system. Iterative and noniterative fast correlation techniques from [7] developed
by Meier and Staffelbach are analyzed in an information-theoretic sense to show that cracking the system
for an eavesdropper becomes less feasible when errors from the physical layer remain uncorrected due
to appropriately chosen channel codes resulting in a decrease of mutual information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II gives the background of the cryptographic
attacks from [7] which are later analyzed to show the correlation between mutual information and system
susceptibility. Section III then provides a discussion on mutual information and EXIT charts in terms of
the attacks, and presents simulation results of attacks on the tandem channel and cryptographic coding
scenario. Conclusions are included in section IV.
II. FAST CORRELATION ATTACKS
LFSR-based keystream generators are used in many cryptographic systems, and have well-known
attacks [7], [8], [9], [10]. We make use of these established algorithms in order to show how channel
coding can enhance security in a wiretap setting. The encryption technique, as portrayed in Fig. 2, requires
a keystream generator with multiple LFSRs which need not be the same length [8]. Each LFSR output
sequence is combined with the others using some function f to form the keystream generator output Z .
The binary message M is encrypted by S = M + Z where all operations are in GF(2). The sequence
S is encoded and transmitted. A receiver decodes the received message to obtain Rm, and then decrypts
using an identical keystream generator which provides a perfect copy of Z and calculates Mˆ = Rm+Z .
As long as the channel code corrects all errors due to the channel, then Mˆ = M . The secret key is
comprised of the initial state of each LFSR in the keystream generator.
The main assumption of fast correlation attacks on this system is that the encryption technique can be
modeled such that a single LFSR output sequence A is correlated with Z . Thus the keystream generator
is portrayed in Fig. 2 as a single LFSR, say the ith one, followed by a BSC with Pr (aj 6= zj) = p1 for
j = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, where aj is the jth bit in the length-N data sequence A. Fast correlation attacks on
this system attempt to retrieve the initial contents of each LFSR in the keystream generator individually,
and are built around the existence of checks (checksums) in A which are then applied to the corresponding
bits of Z . Checks are derived from the structure of the LFSR under attack which can be represented by
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Fig. 2. Overview of wiretap channel model with channel coding and cryptography in a known-plaintext attack scenario. The
keystream generator is modeled as a single LFSR preceding a BSC.
a connection polynomial g(X) = g0+g1X+g2X2+ · · ·+gkXk, where k is the order of the polynomial
and gj ∈ {0, 1} for j = 0, 1, . . . , k. All connection polynomials in the keystream generator are assumed
to be primitive yielding maximal-length output sequences before repeating [11]. Define t as one less
than the number of nonzero coefficients in g(X), and denote the indices of the nonzero coefficients as
j0, j1, . . . , jt. Then the expression aj+j0 + aj+j1 + · · · + aj+jt = 0 forms a check, and thus
aj+ju = aj+j0 + aj+j1 + · · · + aj+ju−1+
aj+ju+1 + · · ·+ aj+jt.
(1)
Almost every bit in A takes part in t+1 checks of this kind. Additional checks are formed by squaring
check expressions in GF(2) [7].
Define w as the total number of checks involving the bit aj , and enumerate these checks from one to
w. We now apply check expressions to bits in Z . Let the vth check be zj = zv1 + zv2 + · · ·+ zvt . Clearly
v ≤ w because zj is in the expression. Define bv =
∑t
l=1 zvl and Lv = zj + bv. Then if the vth check
holds in Z , Lv = 0. Further define s = Pr (bv =
∑t
l=1 avl) which is the probability of an even number
of bit flips in the bits zv1 , zv2 , . . . , zvt . It can be shown that s = s(t− 1) in the recursive calculation
s(l) = (1− p1)s(l − 1) + p1(1− s(l − 1)) (2)
where s(0) = 1 − p1. Now suppose that exactly h of the first w checks hold in Z . Without loss of
generality, let checks enumerated one through h hold. Then we can define
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p∗j = Pr (zj = aj |L1 = · · · = Lh = 0, Lh+1 = · · · = Lw = 1) which is calculated by the expression
p∗j =
(1− p1)s
h(1 − s)w−h
(1− p1)sh(1− s)w−h + p1(1− s)hsw−h
. (3)
Performing the same calculation for all N bits in Z , we form the vector P ∗ = (p∗0, p∗1, . . . , p∗N−1) [7].
Two fast correlation known-plaintext attacks originally presented in [7] are now briefly summarized.
Each attack assumes N bits of the message M are available to the eavesdropper. Furthermore, it is
assumed that the eavesdropper has access to S = M + Z , and thus N bits of Z are readily available.
A. Attack 1
The first attack from [7] is noniterative and maintains as its motivation that those bits of Z which
are included in the greatest number of correct checks are more likely to be equal to their corresponding
bits in A. Since each bit in A is a linear combination of the initial state of the LFSR, it is possible to
solve for the secret key using k bits with linearly independent bit combinations. An attacker selects the
k most reliable bits from Z (i.e. the k bits with the highest corresponding values in P ∗) that form a
linearly independent system of equations. Of course if one or more of these k bits are in error, then the
system of equations will not return the secret key as its solution. The correctness of the solution can
be determined using a threshold comparison on a correlation metric [8]. We consider a worst case by
assuming the attacker is always able to determine whether the key obtained is correct or incorrect. If the
key is incorrect, then the values of the k bits are toggled trying alternate patterns with Hamming distance
1, 2, . . . , k until the correct key is obtained.
B. Attack 2
The second attack given in [7] forms an iterative update between s and P ∗, and employs two nested
levels of iteration. In a particular round of the attack, the algorithm will perform multiple iterations. The
calculation in (2) is modified such that s takes on a different value for each bit-check combination. A
new matrix S is constructed to store these values. Consider the check in (1) and call it the vth check.
Let (q0, q1, . . . , qt−1) = (p∗j+j0, p
∗
j+j1 , . . . , p
∗
j+ju−1, p
∗
j+ju+1, . . . , p
∗
j+jt), respectively. Then the value in S
corresponding to the uth bit of the vth check is Su,v(t− 1) and is calculated recursively as
Su,v(l) = qlSu,v(l − 1) + (1− ql)(1− Su,v(l − 1)) (4)
where Su,v(0) = q0. Prior to iteration p∗thr and Nthr are calculated to act as decision thresholds. The
calculations are based on an optimization of expected correction in the first iteration of the first round.
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Each iteration computes S and P ∗ using (4) and (3) respectively, although (3) must be altered to
incorporate individual values from S. The first calculation of S assumes p∗j = 1−p1 for j = 0, 1, . . . , N−
1. An attacker can estimate the channel parameter p1 by counting correct checks in Z . If after an iteration
there are greater than Nthr elements of P ∗ such that p∗j < pthr, then the round is terminated. A round
consists of a maximum of α iterations. At the end of the round all bits zj such that p∗j < pthr, are
flipped. All P ∗ values are then reset to p1. The attack proceeds in this fashion until it either stagnates, or
converges to the correct solution. Many similarities are present between this attack and Gallager’s LDPC
decoding message-passing algorithm [12].
III. MUTUAL INFORMATION AT THE EAVESDROPPER
With the attacks to be analyzed now well-defined, we consider Fig. 2 in its full context. Note that
an eavesdropper has access to the data sequence Y by applying the known-plaintext to the received
vector Rw which has already been corrected for channel errors as much as possible. We assume a
strictly positive secrecy capacity and choose a channel code which allows the friendly party to correct all
errors due to the main channel, but which leaves some percentage of errors due to the wiretap channel
for the eavesdropper. Therefore Y is a noisy version of Z which can be modeled with a BSC where
the probability of a bit flip from Z to Y is denoted p2. Recall that A and Z are also separated by
a BSC with Pr (aj 6= zj) = p1. A further simplification can occur in the modeling of the relationship
between A and Y by combining the two cascaded BSCs into a single BSC with Pr (aj 6= yj) given as
p′ = p1(1− p2) + p2(1− p1) = p1 + p2 − 2p1p2.
In order to analyze per-letter average mutual information between data sequences, let the bits of each
sequence be modeled as realizations of an underlying random variable. Then probability mass functions
can be estimated using the available data from each sequence [13]. The single BSC model with parameter
p′ provides a convenient mechanism for analysis of information-theoretic security. Under this system,
mutual information between the random variables A and Y is
I(A;Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |A)
= H(Y )−H(p′)
≤ 1−H(p′)
(5)
where H(p) is the binary entropy function. H(p) takes its maximum value of one when p = 0.5 [14].
Thus as p′ → 0.5, then I(A;Y ) → 0 which effectively reduces attack 1 to a brute-force attack.
An estimate for the expected number of trials needed for attack 1 to succeed was originally derived
in [7], and refined in [6]. Suppose attack 1 is applied to the single BSC model. The attack chooses the k
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bits with the highest P ∗ values which also form a linearly independent system of equations. If exactly r
of the k bits have been flipped by the BSC, then the maximum number of trials required to cycle through
all possible bit patterns up to and including r errors is given by
A(k, r) =
r∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
≤ 2H(r/k)k. (6)
In practice r is not known, but it can be estimated. Let w′ be the average number of checks relevant to
any one bit, and h′ be the maximum integer such that k bits exist which are expected to satisfy at least
h′ checks. Then r¯ is equal to
k −
k
∑w′
i=h′
(w′
i
)
(1− p′)si(1− s)w
′
−i∑w′
i=h′
(w′
i
)
((1 − p′)si(1− s)w
′
−i + p′(1− s)isw
′
−i)
where s is calculated using p′ in (2). Thus r¯ of the k chosen bits are expected to be in error. An estimate
on the order of the number of trials required is then given as 2H(r¯/k)k. This estimate is nearer to the true
value when p′ is close to zero because when p′ ≈ 0.5 then H(r¯/k) ≈ 1 and 2H(r¯/k)k ≈ 2k, but the true
average in this case is only 2k−1.
To calculate the mutual information for attack 1, we note that since the ith LFSR is governed by a
primitive connection polynomial, the internal state of the LFSR will take on all nonzero bit combinations.
By definition the least significant bit after the jth shift of the LFSR is aj . Thus A is a maximal-length
sequence which repeats after 2k−1 bits. If A is modeled as a random variable, then Pr (A = 0) = 2k−1−12k−1
and Pr (A = 1) = 2k−12k−1 [15]. For k sufficiently large, both of these probabilities are approximately 0.5.
Using this density on A, and the crossover probability p′ in the aggregate BSC, I(A;Y ) may be calculated
using the equality in (5). We find that as p′ → 0.5 (and thus I(A;Y ) → 0) that the number of required
iterations to recover the secret key by means of attack 1 also increases. Fig. 3 gives the simulated number
of trials required to crack the system as a function of I(A;Y ) for a specific example along with the
estimate from (6).
In the case of attack 1, I(A;Y ) is constant throughout the attack. The information about A imbedded
in Y is extracted and combined with knowledge of the structure of A to find the secret key. However,
in attack 2 the values of bits in Y are modified at the end of each round, thus altering the density on
Y as the attack progresses. Define Y [l] as the Y sequence after the bit flipping in round l of attack 2.
If the attack takes T rounds for Y [l] to either stagnate or converge to A, then an information-theoretic
analysis of attack 2 requires knowledge of I(A;Y [l]) for l = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1. We expect I(A;Y [T−1])
to equal one in a successful attack, and to be less than one in the case of a failure. A tool for viewing
the expected progress of I(A;Y [l]) is the extrinsic information transfer (EXIT) chart. EXIT charts were
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Fig. 3. Number of trials required for a successful attack versus I(A;Y ) using attack 1 where the order of g(X) is k = 15,
t = 4, and N = 1500. Note that t is small relative to k for ease in simulation, but these trends extend to larger t.
designed to give a graphical understanding of the decoding process of turbo codes and have been used
to provide insight on the convergence of LDPC decoding as well [11]. We implement EXIT analysis on
attack 2 in order to characterize the expected value of I(A;Y [l]) for l = 0, 1, . . . , T −1, and thus display
the average results of the attack under any specific channel conditions.
The mutual information between A and Y [l] is
I(A;Y [l]) =
∑
a,y
p(A = a, Y [l] = y) log2
p(A = a, Y [l] = y)
p(A = a)p(Y [l] = y)
where a, y ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore, in order to calculate I(A;Y [l]), we must estimate the probability mass
function of Y [l], as well as the joint mass function of A and Y [l]. Since the channel we are considering
is symmetric, all of this can be done through simulation by counting bits which are still in error at the
end of each round and dividing by the total number of bits. Realize that the increase in information
during round l is I(A;Y [l]) − I(A;Y [l−1]); therefore, we assign the intrinsic and extrinsic information
for round l as I(A;Y [l−1]) and I(A;Y [l]), respectively. The EXIT chart portrays the expected increase in
information by plotting I(A;Y [l−1]) versus I(A;Y [l]) for curve one, while the second curve in the EXIT
chart is I(A;Y [l]) versus I(A;Y [l−1]). Thus the progress of the decoder is shown by reflecting back
and forth between curves. If I(A;Y [l]) goes to one, then the attack converges on the correct sequence;
therefore, there must exist a gap between the two curves if a successful attack is to be expected.
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In order to show average tendencies in the mutual information during attack 2, we construct EXIT
charts using a binning technique. The mutual information I(A;Y [l]) is calculated for every round in a
large number of attacks. Then the expected increase in information is obtained for each section of the
chart by subdividing the x-axis into D equal segments or bins. The data are sorted according to intrinsic
information, and then the extrinsic information is averaged in each bin. The center of each of the D
segments is used as the intrinsic information for the corresponding bin when forming the chart.
Results using this method for a particular set of system parameters averaged over 100 attacks are shown
in Fig. 4. For this example, we assume that the eavesdropper corrects all errors due to the physical layer
yielding p2 = 0. We observe that the EXIT chart predicts an overall tendency for the attack to succeed
due to the gap between curves. We also note that the EXIT curves do not extend to zero. Generating
these curves was implemented by actually simulating attacks on the system. Although some rounds did
yield a negative correction, none resulted in zero extrinsic information; therefore, no rounds exhibited
zero intrinsic information either, leaving bins around zero empty. Finally we observe that the gap between
EXIT curves is narrower for lower intrinsic information regimes. This fact defends the technique used
in [7] and [6] in defining the correction capability of attack 2 using only the expected results in the first
round of an attack. If the first round provides good correction, then the chart indicates that convergence
to A will proceed quickly. When the first round has mediocre or poor correction, the algorithm must
proceed through the pinched region of the gap resulting in slower convergence.
Another EXIT chart for a similar setup as that in Fig. 4 is shown in Fig. 5. The only difference in the
two scenarios is the nonzero value of 0.1 for p2 in the attacks depicted by Fig. 5. This figure shows that
attack 2 is likely to fail due to the crossover in the EXIT chart when a channel code is assumed which
delivers a 10% error rate to the eavesdropper. Again this behavior can be predicted from the average
correction in the first round. Fig. 5 portrays more errors on average following the first round than there
were prior to launching the attack. In this scenario, the expected progress of an attack converges on the
crossover point in the EXIT chart rather than converging to one as in Fig. 4. Thus an attack that would
be otherwise successful can be expected to fail if a channel code can be used to ensure enough errors in
Rw to create a crossing point in the EXIT chart.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we see that mutual information is a meaningful metric in developing the concept of
information-theoretic security. It is verified using mutual information and EXIT charts that fast correlation
attacks can be made more difficult or impossible when channel errors at the physical layer are considered.
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Fig. 4. EXIT chart with D = 20 formed by averaging the results of 100 simulations of attack 2 with k = 31, t = 6, α = 5,
N = 3100, and p1 = p′ = 0.2.
Channel errors can be brought to bear against an eavesdropper through implementing security-enhancing
channel codes. Noniterative attacks which effectively shrink the average search area to find the key
can expect an increase in necessary computations for successful decoding. EXIT charts provide an
excellent analysis tool in determining the increase in security due to channel codes when iterative
cryptographic attacks are employed, signifying an average failure to decode when the curves in the
EXIT chart cross. Finally EXIT analysis may also provide more insight into optimizing attacks on the
LFSR-based encryption scheme presented.
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